SuperbaLearning Demonstration release

Platforms
ENIT
Management and shore-based roles · Open learning path Role-based path

Marine Superintendent

Technical and nautical fleet management

13learning modules
AdvancedLevel
SBL-MS-ADV-01Code
August 2026Reference date

Learning objectives

  • Frame the superintendent's role within the ship management organisation and manage its key interfaces (DPA, crewing, HSEQ, procurement, commercial).
  • Manage the relationship with the «Flag–Class–Port State» triangle and plan the survey and statutory certification cycle.
  • Design and supervise a dry-dock campaign, from specification to post-dock, controlling time, cost and quality.
  • Prepare the ship and crew for PSC inspections and a SIRE 2.0 vetting inspection, managing observations and rectification plans.
  • Build, monitor and analyse a vessel's OPEX budget, identifying cost drivers and control levers.
  • Apply the decarbonisation framework (EEXI, CII, IMO Net-Zero Framework, EU ETS, FuelEU) to fleet management decisions.
  • Conduct a structured incident/near-miss investigation with root cause analysis and effective closure of corrective actions.
  • Manage the first hours of a casualty: notifications, preservation of evidence, interface with H&M, P&I and class.
Module 01

The role of the Marine Superintendent

Module objectivePosition the Marine Superintendent within a ship-management organisation, distinguish it from adjacent shore-based roles and identify its principal interfaces.

The Marine Superintendent (in practice also Technical Superintendent or, with different scopes, Fleet Manager) is a shore-based role to which the company assigns, according to its organisational model and SMS, a technical, operational or safety remit for a group of ships. The role maintains the link between office and ship: translating company policies into day-to-day operations and reporting the ship's actual status to the office. In a third-party ship-management model, the role may also oversee the management contract towards the owner and flag and class requirements.

Technical, Marine and Fleet Superintendent: scopes compared

Titles vary from company to company. In structured organisations, the typical distinction is as follows:

Table 1 — Technical, Marine and Fleet Superintendent: scopes compared
RoleMain focusTypical interfaces
Technical SuperintendentEngine room, maintenance, class, dry-dock, technical budgetChief Engineer, class, yards, procurement
Marine SuperintendentDeck, navigation, operational safety, cargo, nautical auditMaster, HSEQ, terminals, vetting
Fleet ManagerCoordination of multiple superintendents, fleet performance, clientManagement, owner, DPA, commercial
DPA (for comparison)SMS link between ship and top management; direct access to top management; monitoring and support, according to the authorities defined in the SMSTop management, Master, RO/flag

Table 1.1 — Typical breakdown of shore-based technical management roles (indicative).

Terminology note

In many lean companies, a single person combines the roles of Technical and Marine Superintendent. The course uses «Superintendent» in a broad sense, noting where the marine or technical scope makes a difference.

Position within the organisation

In a typical organisational configuration, the Marine/Technical Superintendent may report to the Fleet or Technical Director and maintains functional interfaces with other shore functions and the assigned ships. The ISM Code does not prescribe this organisation chart: responsibilities, authority, interrelations and lines of communication must be defined and documented in the company’s Safety Management System.

The DPA has direct access to the highest level of management (ISM Code, §4). The Code does not establish a predefined hierarchical relationship between the DPA and the Superintendent: authority and interrelations depend on the organisation documented by the company, without limiting the DPA’s direct access to top management.

On board, the Master retains overriding authority and responsibility to make the decisions necessary for safety and pollution prevention and to request the company’s assistance when required (ISM Code, §5.2).

IMO explains that the Code is expressed in broad terms because companies, organisational structures and operating conditions may differ. Official IMO page on the ISM Code ↗

Indicative organisation chart for the Superintendent, DPA and principal interfaces.
Indicative organisational diagram: roles, authority and lines of communication depend on the company’s SMS.

Span of control: how many ships?

The number of ships a superintendent can manage (span of control) depends on vessel type, age, operating area and technical complexity. An excessive workload is a well-known latent factor in accidents: it reduces time on board and the quality of oversight. An example of how to frame it, to be defined on the fleet profile:

Table 2 — Span of control: how many ships?
SegmentRelative spanNotes
Tanker / gas / chemicalnarrower spanHigh vetting and maintenance intensity, narrower span
Container / Ro-Rointermediate spanSystem complexity, fast turnarounds
Dry bulk / general cargowider spanSimpler systems, wider span
Older ships (>15 years)−1 relative to segmentHigher maintenance and class workload

Table 1.2 — Span of control by segment: relative width, not reference figures. The absolute value is set on the fleet profile.

Superintendent KPIs

Role performance is measured on a balanced scorecard across safety, technical and economic dimensions. A good KPI set avoids rewarding cost savings at the expense of safety:

Table 3 — Superintendent KPIs
AreaKPICompany threshold — to be defined
SafetyLTIF (Lost Time Injury Frequency, lost-time injuries per 106 hours worked); near-misses per ship/monthLTIF threshold and expected near-miss threshold
ClassOverdue surveys; open Conditions of Class0 overdue; CoCs closed on time
PSCDeficiencies per inspection; detention rateDeficiency-per-inspection threshold; no detentions
VettingSIRE observations per inspection; rejection rateDownward trend; 0 commercial rejections
MaintenancePMS overdue jobs; critical spares availabilityOverdue threshold; critical spares availability threshold
EconomicsOPEX variance vs budget; off-hire days± contained variance; minimal off-hire
EnvironmentCII rating; consumption vs baselineRating C or better; downward trend

Table 1.3 — Superintendent KPI dashboard. The thresholds are not industry benchmarks: they are set on the fleet profile and the company historical data.

Superintendent Focus — the cost-cutting trap

Every euro «saved» by postponing maintenance or reducing critical spares creates a technical debt that comes back, amplified, as off-hire, detention or an accident. The mature superintendent defends the safety budget against commercial pressure and documents decisions: traceability is their first professional and legal protection.

Key takeaways

  • The title and perimeter of the role vary between organisations: Technical, Marine and Fleet Superintendent are not synonyms.
  • Technical and nautical responsibilities may overlap: what counts is the actual organisation chart, not the label.
  • The role connects company policy with the real operational condition of the fleet.
Module 02

International regulatory architecture

Module objectiveNavigate the hierarchy between IMO conventions, class rules and flag legislation, and know which certificate is at stake in any decision.

The ship lives within a network of international conventions, mandatory codes, class rules and flag legislation. The superintendent must move confidently through this hierarchy to know, in every decision, «who has the final say» and which certificate is at stake.

The fundamental IMO instruments

Table 4 — The fundamental IMO instruments
InstrumentSubjectRelevance for the Superintendent
SOLAS 1974Safety of life at sea; structure, systems, life-saving, fire safetyBasis of almost all statutory certificates; chapters IX (ISM) and XI-2 (ISPS)
MARPOL 73/78Pollution prevention (Annexes I–VI)IOPP, IAPP, EEXI/CII (Annex VI), waste and discharge management
ISM CodeSafety management (SMS)Company DOC and ship SMC; the heart of the role
ISPS CodeShip and port securitySSP, CSO/SSO, ISSC
MLC 2006Maritime labour, crew welfareMLC Certificate + DMLC I/II; growing PSC inspections
STCW 78 (Manila)Training, certification, watchkeepingManning, endorsements, hours of rest
Load Lines 66Freeboard, watertight integrityILLC; assignment conditions
COLREG 72Rules for preventing collisionsNautical audits, bridge procedures
Tonnage 69Gross/net tonnageBasis for taxes, fees, regulatory thresholds (e.g. 5,000 GT)
BWM 2004Ballast water managementBWMC, treatment systems; for ships subject to the Convention, the transitional timetable towards D-2 was generally completed by 8 September 2024, subject to applicable exceptions, exemptions and equivalences; commissioning testing of the system
AFS 2001Anti-fouling systemsIAFS Certificate; cybutryne ban
Hong Kong 2009 (in force since 26.6.2025)Safe recycling of shipsIHM maintained on board; Ready for Recycling Certificate at end of life

Table 2.1 — Main IMO instruments and their operational impact.

The Flag – Class – Port State triangle

Three different parties oversee the ship's compliance, with distinct roles the superintendent must keep separate:

  • Flag Administration (Flag State): holder of sovereignty over the ship; issues or authorises statutory certificates and sets national requirements. Often delegates verifications to a Recognized Organization.
  • Classification society / RO: verifies compliance with its own class rules (structure, machinery) and, as an RO, carries out statutory verifications on behalf of the flag. Issues the class certificate.
  • Port State Control (PSC): the port State inspects foreign ships to verify compliance with conventions; can detain the ship (detention). It does not «manage» the ship: it controls it.
Key point

Class and statutory status are distinct tracks that often run together (the same RO handles both) but answer to different masters: class to its own rules, statutory to the flag. A Condition of Class is not a PSC deficiency, and vice versa: confusing the two leads to wrong decisions on priorities and deadlines.

Key takeaways

  • SOLAS, MARPOL, ISM, ISPS, MLC and STCW underpin almost every statutory certificate.
  • The Flag–Class–Port State triangle assigns distinct roles: who issues, who verifies by delegation, who inspects in port.
  • Knowing who has the final word prevents treating requirements of different natures as equivalent.
Module 03

ISM Code and Safety Management System leadership

Module objectiveRecognise the structure of the ISM Code, the relationship between DOC and SMC, and the cycle of non-conformity, corrective action and Management of Change.

The ISM Code (SOLAS Ch. IX) has been mandatory since 1998 for the first categories and since 2002 for the generality of convention ships. It requires every company to have a documented and verified Safety Management System (SMS). In practice, the superintendent is the main «engine» of the SMS at ship level: feeding it, verifying it and improving it.

Structure of the Code

The Code is organised into functional elements that define responsibilities, procedures and improvement cycles. Operational summary:

Table 5 — Structure of the Code
§ElementWhat the Superintendent oversees
1General provisions, objectives, definitionsUnderstands the scope and purpose of the SMS
2Safety and environmental policyKeeps it alive on board, not just a poster
3Company responsibility and authorityOrganisation chart, delegations, resources
4Designated Person (DPA)Cooperates with the DPA; respects their autonomy
5Master's responsibility and authoritySupports the Master's authority, does not erode it
6Resources and personnelManning, familiarisation, competence
7Shipboard operationsProcedures for critical operations
8Emergency preparednessDrills, scenarios, joint exercises
9Non-conformities, accidents, near-missesReporting, analysis, corrective actions
10Maintenance of ship and equipmentPMS, critical equipment, critical spares
11DocumentationDocument and record control
12Verification, review, evaluationInternal audits and management review

Table 3.1 — ISM Code elements and the Superintendent's operational oversight.

DOC and SMC

The Document of Compliance (DOC) certifies the company's system for the ship types it manages; the Safety Management Certificate (SMC) certifies the individual ship. The DOC must be verified annually; the SMC has a five-year cycle with an intermediate verification. The superintendent monitors deadlines and verifications: an expired SMC commercially immobilises the ship.

Table 6 — DOC and SMC
CertificateSubjectVerification cycle
DOCCompany system (per ship type)5-year issue; annual verification
Copy of DOC on boardProof the company holds a valid DOCMust be present on board
SMCSMS of the individual ship5-year issue; 1 intermediate verification (between 2nd and 3rd year)

Table 3.2 — ISM certification.

Non-conformities, corrective actions and Management of Change

The SMS virtuous cycle is: detection (audit, inspection, near-miss) → root cause analysis → corrective action → effectiveness verification. The superintendent must distinguish correction (putting out the fire) from corrective action (preventing recurrence), avoiding a formal «patch-up» closure that leaves the root cause intact.

  • Non-conformity (NC): deviation from requirements. A major NC that seriously threatens safety or the environment can lead to withdrawal/suspension of the certificate.
  • Corrective action (CAPA): addresses the cause; its effectiveness must be verified over time, not just its implementation.
  • Management of Change (MoC): every change to equipment, procedures, crew or operations must be assessed for the risks it introduces before being implemented. It is the weakest link most often found in real systems.
Superintendent Focus — the near-miss culture

A «too low» near-miss rate is not a success: it usually signals under-reporting and fear of reporting. The superintendent who builds trust (no blame for good-faith reports) gets more data, earlier, and prevents serious accidents. The ratio between minor and serious events (the logic of the Heinrich/Bird pyramid) makes the base of the pyramid the real mine of prevention.

Key takeaways

  • The DOC certifies the company and the SMC the individual ship: one does not substitute for the other.
  • The SMS lives on evidence: recorded non-conformities, corrective action on the cause and verification of effectiveness.
  • Management of Change is the safeguard against modifications introduced without risk assessment.
Module 04

Advanced technical management and maintenance

Module objectiveChoose between the four maintenance strategies according to equipment criticality, and govern the PMS, critical systems and the spares policy that follows.

Maintenance is the economic and safety heart of technical management. The superintendent does not «repair»: they design and govern a maintenance strategy that keeps the ship reliable, compliant and available at the lowest life-cycle cost.

The four maintenance strategies

No strategy is «the best» in absolute terms: the choice depends on the criticality of the equipment, redundancy and the availability of condition data.

Matrix of maintenance strategies for critical machinery.
Matrix of maintenance strategies for critical machinery.
Table 7 — The four maintenance strategies
StrategyPrincipleWhen to use it
Reactive (run-to-failure)Action taken on failureOnly where risk assessment, redundancy and the SMS allow it
Preventive (time-based)Fixed intervals (hours/calendar) from the PMSStandard on board, accepted by class
Condition-based (CBM)Action triggered by indicators (vibration, oil, thermography)Monitorable critical machinery
Predictive (analytics)Models and trends estimating remaining lifeFleets with sensors and data platforms

Table 4.1 — Comparison of maintenance strategies.

Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

The PMS is the structured record of scheduled maintenance work and its related documentation. Many Administrations and classification societies accept PMS-based maintenance schemes in place of certain surveys (approved Planned Maintenance Scheme). The superintendent oversees its coverage, adherence (overdue jobs) and integration with spare parts management.

Critical equipment and critical spares

The ISM Code (§10.3) requires identifying equipment and technical systems whose sudden failure could create hazardous situations, and taking specific measures to promote their reliability, including regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment not in continuous use. On that basis the company defines in its own SMS and PMS which critical spares to keep on board or readily available: the list follows from risk assessment, redundancy, makers' instructions and class rules, not from the text of the Code. The availability of critical spares is a safety KPI, not just a logistical one.

Useful reliability metrics

MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures): average time between failures; measures the reliability of a component.

Availability: the proportion of time the equipment is ready for use; target close to 100% for critical systems.

Maintenance backlog: overdue open jobs; a growing backlog anticipates class and reliability problems.

Key takeaways

  • No strategy is best in absolute terms: reactive, preventive, condition-based and predictive are chosen by criticality and redundancy.
  • The PMS is how class verifies that maintenance is planned and traceable.
  • The ISM Code requires identifying critical systems and promoting their reliability; the company defines the critical spares in its own SMS.
Module 05

Class and survey management

Module objectiveGovern the five-year survey cycle under the harmonised regime and distinguish Conditions of Class from Recommendations.

The ship maintains class and statutory certificates through a cycle of surveys. Managing this cycle — anticipating windows and requirements — avoids class suspensions and commercial downtime. It is a distinctive competence of the technical superintendent.

The harmonised regime (HSSC)

The Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC) harmonises STATUTORY survey and certification on a five-year cycle, with anniversary windows defined by the applicable certificate. The CLASS cycle — Special Survey, class annuals, CMS — is a separate regime, governed by the society rules, and must be planned alongside the first without being confused with it. This allows visits to be concentrated and downtime reduced. The typical scheme:

Five-year survey cycle under the harmonised regime (indicative diagram).
Five-year survey cycle under the harmonised regime (indicative diagram).
Table 8 — Two distinct regimes: statutory (HSSC) and class
RegimeSurveyContentPeriodicity
Statutory (HSSC)AnnualGeneral verification of certificate validityEvery year, within the window of the applicable certificate
Statutory (HSSC)IntermediateIn-depth review according to certificate and ship typeBetween 2nd and 3rd anniversary
Statutory (HSSC)RenewalRenewal of the statutory certificateEvery 5 years
ClassClass annualGeneral verification under the society rulesEvery year, society window
ClassSpecial SurveyFull class renewal, often in dry-dockEvery 5 years
ClassCMSContinuous Machinery Survey: rotating machinery, where the society provides for itItems spread across the five-year cycle
HullBottom / docking inspectionHull and underwater inspectionRule and intervals depend on ship type, age and applicable certificate; for many ships two inspections in the cycle
StructureESPEnhanced Survey Programme: applies to bulk carriers and oil tankersOverlaid on the cycle, under the ESP programme

Table 5.1 — Types of survey in the class cycle.

Conditions of Class and Recommendations

When a survey identifies a deficiency that is not immediately resolved, the classification society may impose a Condition of Class — or the equivalent term used by that society — with a deadline tied to the maintenance of class. Recommendations, remarks and memoranda instead follow the society rules and do not automatically carry the same effect. Failure to comply with a condition, or with a survey that falls within the suspension procedures, leads to suspension of class, with cascading effects on insurance (H&M, P&I), chartering and statutory status. The superintendent keeps a live register of CoCs with dates and closure plans.

Superintendent Focus — planning backwards

The golden rule is to plan the five-year cycle backwards from the Special Survey: fix the dry-dock and Special windows first, then build intermediates, annuals and CMS around them. Those who chase deadlines one by one end up paying for unplanned downtime and full-price yard slots.

Key takeaways

  • The HSSC harmonises statutory certification on a five-year cycle; the class cycle is a separate regime to be planned alongside it.
  • Annual, Intermediate and Special surveys differ in content and window: anticipating them avoids commercial downtime.
  • A Condition of Class carries a deadline tied to class maintenance; a recommendation follows its own rules and is not equivalent.
Module 06

Dry-dock management

Module objectiveSet up a dry-dock campaign as a project: critical path, repair specification, tendering, yard supervision and post-dock closure.

Dry-dock is the single most costly and complex event in the ship's life cycle after construction. It is a project in its own right, with a budget, critical path, suppliers and risks. The ability to run it distinguishes the experienced superintendent.

The project's critical path

A well-managed dry-dock starts months before entering the dock. Long lead-time activities (spares, yard selection) must start well in advance so as not to become the bottleneck.

Typical critical path of a dry-dock campaign (indicative diagram, weeks).
Typical critical path of a dry-dock campaign (indicative diagram, weeks).

Preparing the specification and tender

The repair specification is the contractual document that describes every job in detail, quantity and standard. An ambiguous specification is the leading cause of extra costs at the yard. Yard selection balances price, location, technical capability, availability and reputation.

Table 9 — Preparing the specification and tender
Yard selection criterionWhat to assessTypical weight
Price and termsQuotation, dock days, growth work rateHigh
LocationDeviation from route, positioning off-hireHigh
Technical capabilitySuitable dock, competencies, subcontractingHigh
Slot availabilityCompatibility with class windowMedium
Track record / QHSEHistory, safety, environmentMedium
Guarantees and paymentMilestones, guarantees, penaltiesMedium

Table 6.1 — Repair yard selection criteria.

Site control and post-dock

During the works, the superintendent (or the site team) oversees progress, quality, safety and, above all, growth work: additional jobs that emerge in the dock, which must be approved in writing with an agreed price before execution. The post-dock report closes the project: final cost/time reconciliation, lessons learned, warranties to activate.

Superintendent Focus — uncontrolled growth work

The most common budget black hole is not the initial specification but growth work authorised verbally, «so as not to stop the works». Iron rule: no additional work without a written variation order with an agreed price. A daily growth work log signed by both parties is the best defence against surprises on the final invoice.

Key takeaways

  • A dry-dock is prepared months in advance: long lead-time items set the critical path.
  • An ambiguous repair specification is the primary cause of extra costs in the yard.
  • Yard selection balances price, location, capacity and availability, not price alone.
Module 07

Port State Control

Module objectiveUnderstand how the MoUs select ships for inspection and what turns a deficiency into a detention.

Port State Control is the system by which port States inspect foreign ships to enforce international conventions. A detention costs off-hire, reputation and charterers' attention. The superintendent works to ensure PSC inspections close without detainable deficiencies.

The MoUs and regional regimes

Inspections are coordinated by regional Memoranda of Understanding. The main ones: Paris MoU (Europe/North Atlantic), Tokyo MoU (Asia-Pacific), plus the US Coast Guard's autonomous regime. Each regime publishes performance lists (white/grey/black list) of flags and companies.

Ship Risk Profile and targeting

Within the Paris MoU, the New Inspection Regime assigns each ship a risk profile that determines the frequency and type of inspection. The profile depends on generic parameters (type, age), historical parameters (flag, RO, company) and performance parameters (past deficiencies and detentions).

Ship risk profile under the Paris MoU (indicative diagram).
Ship risk profile under the Paris MoU (indicative diagram).

Deficiencies and detention

Deficiencies are classified by severity; some require rectification before departure, others within a set period, and the most serious result in detention. Recurring detention areas include fire safety, life-saving appliances, ISM («systemic» deficiencies revealing a purely formal SMS), MLC and the engine room.

Table 10 — Deficiencies and detention
Action codeMeaningOperational implication
15 — rectify at next portDeficiency deferred to the next callTo be closed and documented on arrival
16 — rectify within 14 daysMinor deficiency with a deadlineEvidence of closure to be sent to the authority
17 — rectify before departureDeficiency to be resolved in portDelay risk; no detention if resolved
21 — company ISM corrective action within 3 monthsISM deficiency (item 15150) not warranting detentionCommits the office, not the ship; at 3 months it generates an unexpected factor
19 — flag State audit before departureDetainable ISM deficiencyThe ship does not sail until the Administration has audited the SMS
46 — rectify at agreed repair portDetainable deficiency with an authorised transferAfter the ETA at the repair yard an unexpected factor is triggered

Table 7.1 — Paris MoU PSC action codes, extract (PSCC59/2026/03, Annex 1; each regime uses its own coding). Detention has no numeric code: it is recorded with the «Grounds for detention» tick box alongside the deficiency.

Superintendent Focus — ISM deficiencies are the most insidious

A broken light is an isolated deficiency; an ISM deficiency signals that the system is not working and attracts stricter inspections (an ISM-related detention often triggers a supplementary company audit). Preparing the ship for PSC mainly means keeping the real SMS alive, not polishing the ship the night before.

Key takeaways

  • Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and the autonomous USCG regime apply different targeting criteria.
  • The Ship Risk Profile combines generic parameters, inspection history and the performance of flag, RO and company.
  • The difference between a deficiency and a detainable deficiency lies in severity and immediacy of risk, not in number.
Module 08

Vetting and SIRE 2.0

Module objectiveRecognise what changes with SIRE 2.0 and how vetting and TMSA determine commercial access to the tanker market.

In the tanker world (oil, chemical, gas) access to chartering runs through vetting: oil major companies assess a ship's suitability before entrusting it with cargo. The central tool is OCIMF's SIRE programme. A ship that is not «vettable» is, in practice, commercially excluded from that market.

SIRE 2.0: the new regime

Since 2 September 2024 SIRE 2.0 is the OCIMF programme that replaced VIQ7. It is not an incremental update: it generates a CVIQ tailored to the ship and combines different question types, response tools, evidence and observations, with greater attention to human and organisational factors.

Table 11 — SIRE 2.0: the new regime
SIRE 2.0 elementWhat changes for the ship and crew
Dynamic questionnaire (CVIQ)Each inspection generates a set of questions tailored to the ship: no more «learned by heart» answers
Tablet-based inspectionPhotographic evidence and observations recorded in real time in the digital record
Differentiated response toolsEach response tool has its own scale: depending on the question it may be binary or graded
Three dimensions per questionHardware, procedures and human factors assessed together
Performance Influencing FactorsA set of human/organisational factors assessed through interaction with the crew
Focus on real competenceThe crew must demonstrate operational competence, not memorised answers

Table 8.1 — Distinctive features of SIRE 2.0.

The vetting ecosystem and TMSA

SIRE does not exist in isolation. TMSA (Tanker Management and Self Assessment) is the tool with which the company self-assesses and improves its management system by element (KPIs and best practices at progressive levels). For chemical tankers there is also the CDI scheme. The superintendent oversees both the outcome of individual inspections and the system maturity measured by TMSA.

Superintendent Focus — preparing for the inspection

With SIRE 2.0, preparation changes in nature: you no longer «train to answer», you build real competence and consistency between procedures, hardware and behaviour. Internal pre-vetting (a simulated internal inspection) remains the best tool, but it should be aimed at verifying that the crew can actually perform, not repeat. Observations should be closed with traceable actions, not justifications.

Key takeaways

  • Since 2 September 2024 SIRE 2.0 is the OCIMF programme that replaced VIQ7.
  • The dynamic CVIQ generates ship-specific questions: memorised answers no longer work.
  • TMSA is the company’s self-assessment and vetting assesses the ship: the two levels support each other.
Module 09

OPEX budgeting and cost control

Module objectiveBuild and monitor an OPEX budget, recognise its cost drivers and carry out variance analysis.

The superintendent is responsible for the operating budget (OPEX) of the ships under management. Managing OPEX means building a realistic budget, monitoring variances and acting on cost drivers without compromising safety and compliance.

The structure of OPEX

Daily OPEX (often expressed as cost per day) groups together recurring management items. The breakdown varies by ship type and flag, but crew costs are almost always the dominant item:

Indicative breakdown of daily OPEX (dry-cargo vessel).
Indicative breakdown of daily OPEX (dry-cargo vessel).

Budget cycle and variance analysis

The typical cycle: annual budget (bottom-up from the ship + top-down from the company) → monthly/quarterly monitoring → variance analysis → updated forecast → review. Variance analysis distinguishes causes (price, volume, timing) to avoid wrong conclusions.

Table 12 — Budget cycle and variance analysis
ItemBudget (€/day)Actual (€/day)Reading the variance
Crew3,1003,250Currency change / overtime: monitor
Maintenance and repairs1,3301,680Unplanned failure: check the causes
Spares890780Purchase timing: possible slippage
Stores and lubricants665690In line
Insurance (H&M / P&I)665665Fixed contractual
Management fee445445Fixed contractual
Registration, surveys, sundries295320Unplanned additional survey
Total (indicative)7,3907,830+6.0%: driven by unscheduled maintenance

Table 9.1 — Example of a monthly variance analysis: dry-cargo vessel, mixed crew (illustrative values, consistent with the OPEX breakdown chart).

Superintendent Focus — a realistic budget beats a «nice» budget

A budget trimmed to please management only produces negative variances and eroded credibility. Better a defensible budget with explicit assumptions (ship age, class plan, dry-dock in the period) and a contingency reserve. The variance should be explained by its cause, not hidden: transparency builds trust and freedom of action.

Key takeaways

  • Crew is almost always the dominant item in daily OPEX.
  • The cycle runs from annual budget through monitoring, variance analysis, updated forecast and review.
  • Separating the causes of a variance — price, volume, timing — prevents wrong conclusions.
Module 10

Decarbonisation and environmental compliance

Module objectiveTranslate EEXI, CII, the IMO Net-Zero Framework, EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime into concrete ship and operational decisions.

Decarbonisation is today the most dynamic and strategically relevant regulatory front for fleet management. The superintendent must translate an evolving framework into concrete decisions on the ship, operations and investment. This module is updated as of August 2026, after MEPC 84 (27 April – 1 May 2026): always check the latest version in force.

Starting point: EEXI and CII

Two instruments already in force stem from MARPOL Annex VI: the EEXI (Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index), a one-off technical requirement on the design efficiency of the existing ship; and the CII (Carbon Intensity Indicator), an annual operational indicator that assigns the ship a rating from A to E based on actual carbon intensity, with a reduction line that tightens over time.

CII rating bands and reduction line (indicative diagram).
CII rating bands and reduction line (indicative diagram).

A ship rated D for three consecutive years, or E for one year, must submit a plan of corrective actions in the SEEMP (Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan), part III. The superintendent monitors the rating during the year and activates operational levers in good time (speed, trim, hull cleaning, energy efficiency).

The reduction factors against the 2019 reference line are adopted up to 2030: −5% in 2023, −7% in 2024, −9% in 2025, −11% in 2026 and, by resolution MEPC.400(83) of 11 April 2025, −13.625% in 2027, −16.250% in 2028, −18.875% in 2029, −21.500% in 2030. The second phase of the CII and SEEMP review, started at MEPC 84 and due to be completed by 2028, continues and may change the picture, but it does not make already adopted values undetermined. In the chart above it is the ship trajectory that is illustrative, not the required line.

The leap: the IMO Net-Zero Framework

In April 2025, at the MEPC 83 session, IMO approved the Net-Zero Framework: the world's first set of measures combining a mandatory limit on emissions intensity with a global carbon pricing mechanism for an entire sector. The measures will apply to large ships above 5,000 GT, responsible for the vast majority of the sector's emissions.

The framework has two elements: a GHG Fuel Intensity standard (GFI) that progressively reduces the carbon intensity of fuel, and a pricing mechanism that charges for excess emissions and rewards zero/near-zero emission fuels, with an IMO Net-Zero Fund redistributing proceeds. The rules are structured as a new chapter of MARPOL Annex VI.

GFI trajectory towards net-zero and tiered compliance logic (indicative diagram).
GFI trajectory towards net-zero and tiered compliance logic (indicative diagram).
Status as of August 2026

The Net-Zero Framework was approved at MEPC 83 (April 2025) but is not yet adopted. The extraordinary MEPC session convened in October 2025 to adopt it was adjourned for twelve months; at MEPC 84 (27 April – 1 May 2026) no compromise was reached between those seeking adoption with minimal change and those arguing for a market readiness approach. Work continues in two intersessional working groups (ISWG-GHG), with the next step expected at MEPC 85 (30 November – 3 December 2026) and an extraordinary session on 4 December. With no adopted text, there is no entry-into-force date and no date of application: tacit acceptance would only start running from adoption (ordinarily around 16 months). Avoid the opposite mistake: the framework exists and the figures quoted here are those of the approved text. The distinction to keep is approved ≠ adopted ≠ in force ≠ applicable.

ECAs and sulphur limits

The global sulphur limit in fuel is 0.50% m/m; inside Emission Control Areas it drops to 0.10%. The areas in force or already decided are:

  • Baltic Sea, North Sea, North America and the United States Caribbean Sea — SOx ECAs (and NOx Tier III areas: the first two from 2021, North America from 2016).
  • Mediterranean Sea — SOx ECA from 1 May 2025: it directly affects European trading and bunker planning.
  • North-East Atlantic — adopted at MEPC 84 (April–May 2026) by resolution MEPC.407(84); the amendments enter into force on 1 September 2027, with the ECA requirements applying from 1 September 2028.

For the superintendent this means planning the fuel changeover and its engine-room log entries, checking tank segregation and keeping the documentary evidence on board (bunker delivery notes, samples).

End of life: the Hong Kong Convention

The Hong Kong Convention for the safe and environmentally sound recycling of ships has been in force since 26 June 2025. It requires the Inventory of Hazardous Materials (IHM) to be maintained and updated throughout the ship's life, verified by the flag or the RO, and — at the end of life — the Ready for Recycling Certificate and delivery to an authorised facility. For ships calling at EU ports it overlaps with the European Ship Recycling Regulation, which already required the IHM. The superintendent is the operational custodian of the IHM: every plant modification or new material supplied on board must be reflected in the inventory.

The European front: EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime

In parallel with IMO, the European Union has extended its emissions trading system (EU ETS) to maritime transport. The phase-in is complete: 40% of verified emissions had to be surrendered for 2024, 70% for 2025 and 100% from 1 January 2026. From 2026 the scope is no longer CO2 alone: it also covers methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). It applies to 100% of emissions on voyages between EU/EEA ports and to 50% of those entering or leaving the area; allowances are surrendered by 30 September of the following year, on the basis of the verified MRV report.

The FuelEU Maritime regulation, from 1 January 2025, imposes decreasing limits on the greenhouse gas intensity of the energy used on board by ships calling at EU/EEA ports, with pooling, banking and borrowing mechanisms and penalties for exceedance. For the superintendent this means monitoring consumption, document management (monitoring plan, verified report, FuelEU database) and fuel choices with direct economic impact.

Reporting: EU MRV and IMO DCS

Carbon pricing and intensity standards rest on a data chain the superintendent must govern as tightly as a survey. Two regimes coexist: the IMO DCS (ships of 5,000 GT and above; annual consumption by fuel type, distance travelled and hours under way) and the EU MRV (a wider scope: ships of 5,000 GT and above and, from 1 January 2025, also general cargo ships between 400 and 5,000 GT and offshore ships of 400 GT and above, on EU/EEA voyages, with per-voyage and per-ship emission data; the EU ETS follows its own rules and timing).

  • By 31 March: previous-year data submitted to the verifier and, for MRV, the verified report uploaded to THETIS-MRV.
  • By 31 May: issue of the DCS Statement of Compliance, to be kept on board.
  • By 30 June: verified data transmitted to the IMO database; the MRV document of compliance carried on board.
  • By 30 September: surrender of EU ETS allowances for the previous year.
  • FuelEU: report to the verifier by 31 January, verification by 31 March, data marked as verified by 30 April.

The practical risk is not the deadline but data quality: bunker delivery notes and flowmeter readings must reconcile with the engine-room records, because that figure is what allowances are paid on and what the CII rating is calculated from. An inconsistency found at verification costs more than a year of careful recording.

Table 13 — Reporting: EU MRV and IMO DCS
InstrumentScopeManagement impact
EEXITechnical, one-offDesign verification; possible power limitation (EPL)
CIIOperational, annualA–E rating; SEEMP actions; operational levers
IMO Net-Zero (GFI)Global, ships above 5,000 GTFuel standard + emissions pricing (approved, not yet adopted)
EU ETSEU/EEA routes100% of allowances surrendered from 2026; CH4 and N2O also covered from 2026
FuelEU MaritimeEU/EEA routesOnboard energy intensity limit; pooling and penalties

Table 10.1 — Overview of decarbonisation instruments.

Alternative fuels: an overview

Table 14 — Alternative fuels: an overview
FuelAdvantagesDrawbacks
LNGMature, reduced SOx/NOxUnburned methane (methane slip); not net-zero
MethanolLiquid, simpler handlingLow energy density; limited green availability
AmmoniaZero carbon at combustionToxicity, safety, engines still in development
BiofuelsDrop-in, minimal ship modificationFeedstock availability and sustainability
Hydrogen / fuel cellsZero exhaust emissionsStorage, density, immature infrastructure

Table 10.2 — Alternative fuels: summary comparison table.

Key takeaways

  • EEXI is a one-off technical requirement; CII is an annual operational indicator rated A to E.
  • The European front, EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime, overlaps the IMO framework: they must be managed together.
  • The picture is moving: this module is current to August 2026, after MEPC 84.
Module 11

Incident investigation and root cause analysis

Module objectiveConduct a structured investigation that reaches the underlying causes and closes with verified corrective action.

Every incident and every near-miss is valuable information. A structured investigation turns the event into prevention. The superintendent must conduct investigations that go beyond «operator blame» to organisational and latent causes.

The investigation process

  • Securing the scene and immediate collection of evidence (facts, not opinions; objective data, testimony, recordings).
  • Reconstruction of the sequence of events (timeline).
  • Identification of immediate, contributing and root causes.
  • Definition of corrective actions on the root cause, with owners and deadlines.
  • Verification of effectiveness and sharing of lessons learned across the fleet.

Root cause analysis methods

Table 15 — Root cause analysis methods
MethodPrincipleTypical use
5 WhysAsking «why» repeatedly down to the rootSimple events, quick analysis
Ishikawa (fishbone)Causes grouped by category (man, machine, method...)Structured brainstorming
TRIPOD Beta / barrier modelLatent causes and failed barriersComplex events, organisational factors
Fault/Event TreeCombinatorial logic of failures/eventsComplex technical systems

Table 11.1 — Main root cause analysis methods.

Superintendent Focus — beyond «human error»

Stopping at «the operator made a mistake» is the surest way to let the accident happen again. Human error is almost always the symptom of latent conditions: ambiguous procedures, fatigue, insufficient training, time pressure, design that invites error. The right question is not «who made the mistake» but «why did the error become likely for a competent person».

Key takeaways

  • An investigation starts from facts and objective evidence, not from opinions.
  • 5 Whys, Ishikawa and the other methods are chosen according to the complexity of the event.
  • Corrective action without verification of effectiveness and fleet-wide dissemination does not close the cycle.
Module 12

Digitalisation and emerging risks

Module objectiveAssess the use of condition monitoring, fleet analytics and remote surveys, and place cyber risk inside the SMS.

Technical management is changing shape: data, connectivity and new threats are redefining the superintendent's job. Those who master these tools gain more control and foresight; those who ignore them fall behind.

From data to decision

  • Condition monitoring and IoT: sensors on critical machinery feed condition-based and predictive maintenance, reducing failures and downtime.
  • Fleet performance & noon-data analytics: consumption, speed and weather data processed to optimise routes and reduce carbon intensity (with a direct impact on CII).
  • Remote & digital surveys: some class verifications are carried out remotely, reducing waiting times and costs, within the limits allowed by the RO.

Cyber security on board

A connected ship is also a ship that can be attacked. IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in the Safety Management System (SMS); that expectation is verified within the ISM implementation of the company and its Administration, from the first annual DOC verification after 1 January 2021. The superintendent oversees the inventory of OT/IT systems, network segregation, access management, updates and crew training.

For newbuildings, IACS UR E26 and E27 also apply to ships contracted for construction on or after 1 July 2024: the first covers the cyber resilience of the ship as a whole, the second that of individual onboard systems and equipment. Anyone supervising a newbuilding finds them in the specification — not as good practice but as a class requirement.

Superintendent Focus — technology does not replace judgement

Sensors and dashboards provide more information, not more wisdom. The superintendent's value remains in interpreting data in the context of the individual ship and in deciding. The new risk is over-reliance on a dashboard that «looks fine» while the reality on board says otherwise: physical visits and dialogue with the crew remain irreplaceable.

Key takeaways

  • Condition data enables condition-based and predictive maintenance, reducing failures and downtime.
  • Noon-data analytics bear directly on CII through routeing and consumption.
  • MSC.428(98) encourages Administrations to ensure cyber risk is addressed in the SMS: it is verified within the ISM framework.
Module 13

Insurance, claims and emergency response

Module objectiveKnow which cover responds to which event, which notifications to make in the first hour and how evidence is preserved.

The superintendent does not place the policies, but is the person who — when something goes wrong — either builds or destroys the evidence. Knowing who covers what, which notifications to make and how evidence is preserved is what separates a paid claim from a loss the company carries itself.

Who covers what

Table 16 — Who covers what
CoverWhat it answers forNote for the Superintendent
H&M — Hull & MachineryDamage to the ship's hull and machineryDeductible per event; H&M surveyor's inspection before repairs
P&I — Protection & IndemnityThird-party liabilities: pollution, crew, cargo, wreck removalMutual club: notify immediately, it appoints its own surveyor
Loss of Hire (optional)Loss of hire beyond a deductible expressed in daysThe day count is defended with logs and certificates, not from memory
War risksWar risks and listed areasPrior notification for high-risk areas; additional premiums
Cargo insuranceThe cargo itself, for shipper or receiverDoes not cover the ship: watch for security demands in case of average

Table 13.1 — Typical covers of a managed ship.

Off-hire and general average

Under a time charter the ship goes off-hire when an event listed in the clause prevents her from providing the agreed service. The argument is almost never about the principle but about the hours: start, end and cause must be documented with the log book, notification e-mails and technical evidence.

General average (York-Antwerp Rules) is the extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure incurred voluntarily for the common safety of ship and cargo: the cost is shared among all interests. The owner declares it, an average adjuster settles it, and cargo is not released without a guarantee or bond. For the superintendent this means one concrete thing: from the moment of the event every cost must be kept separate and traceable.

The first hour after the event

  • Safety of people and of the ship; everything else comes after.
  • Notifications: owner, DPA, flag, class, P&I and — where there is pollution or a risk of it — the coastal authority under the SOPEP/SMPEP.
  • Preservation of evidence: the VDR keeps the most recent hours in the capsule and a longer period in onboard memory, but it overwrites. The instruction to save the data must be given at once, in writing, and the copy kept dated and signed.
  • Verified facts kept distinct from preliminary hypotheses: no speculation on causes, no unauthorised admission of liability, and no document reconstructed after the fact.
  • A single chronological record of events and communications, opened in the first minute.

Salvage, ERS and emergency plans

In case of grounding, flooding or fire, a ship enrolled in an Emergency Response Service can receive round-the-clock support: residual stability and strength calculations on the lodged model, within hours. It is not automatic: it normally requires a contract, prior enrolment, and an up-to-date model and data. It must be checked in advance, not discovered on the day.

Salvage and assistance terms may be governed by the Lloyd's Open Form (no cure, no pay) or by other agreements; whether SCOPIC — a specific contractual regime of special compensation — applies must be checked against the contract and the clause in force, with P&I and advisers. The difference between commercial towage and salvage is not a matter of wording: it changes who pays, and how much.

United States trading: OPA-90

Depending on ship type, tonnage and activity, an approved Vessel Response Plan, a Qualified Individual reachable around the clock, contracts with qualified OSROs and the Certificate of Financial Responsibility may be required — the last generally for ships above 300 GT, with exceptions, and for ships of any tonnage engaged in lightering or transshipment of oil in the EEZ. Applicability must be checked case by case against 33 CFR and USCG guidance: where they apply they are conditions of entry, and no insurance cover makes up for them.

Superintendent Focus — the claim file

Open a single file from the first minute: chronology, dated photographs, log extracts, correspondence, surveyors' reports. Separate verified facts, preliminary hypotheses and conclusions; do not speculate or admit liability; coordinate reports and communications with the SMS, the authorities, P&I and advisers, preserving the evidence. The SMS, the flag State, the authorities and insurers may require preliminary reports and causal analysis: the risk to avoid is not writing, it is speculating or altering the facts. An orderly file shortens settlement and, in a dispute, is worth more than any later reconstruction.

Key takeaways

  • H&M covers hull and machinery, P&I covers liability to third parties: they are distinct covers.
  • In the first hour what counts is prompt notification and preservation of evidence, not later reconstruction from memory.
  • The Loss of Hire day count is defended with logs and certificates.

Recurring mistakes

From the Mistake Library of SuperbaKnowledge, filtered to the subjects this course covers. This view selects and organises content published in SuperbaKnowledge; it does not modify or replace it. The linked Knowledge page remains the reference version, while official texts remain authoritative.

Recurring mistakes published in SuperbaKnowledge
TopicMistakeTypical consequenceTopic sheet
Annual SurveyAnnual Survey treated as a minor formality, prepared with less rigor than the RenewalEarly indications of problems are not detected or addressed promptlySee the topic sheet
Flag ChangeFlag change completed without ensuring continuity of statutory certificate validityDocumentary gap period in which the ship operates without fully valid certificatesSee the topic sheet
Condition of Class and RecommendationsCondition of Class treated as lower priority than a PSC deficiency or an ISM Non-ConformityDeadline missed, risk of class suspensionSee the topic sheet
HSSC-Vetting CoordinationHSSC calendar and vetting inspection calendar managed separately without being sharedUnintended concentration of surveys and vetting inspections in the same time windowSee the topic sheet
Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA)Corrective action addressing the symptom, not the root causeThe NC recurs in similar formSee the topic sheet
Cyber Risk Management in the SMS (MSC.428(98))Cyber risk managed as a separate IT matter, not integrated into the SMS's general risk assessmentLack of integrated documentary evidence in the event of an audit, despite the existence of technical IT measuresSee the topic sheet
Designated Person Ashore (DPA)DPA appointed only formally, without real access to top managementNC in certification audit, ineffective escalation system in an emergencySee the topic sheet
Document of Compliance (DOC) and Safety Management Certificate (SMC)DOC and SMC periodical verifications treated as if they had the same cadence, applying the SMC's intermediate window to the DOCThe Code does not say the certificate lapses by itself: §13.5 provides for withdrawal of the DOC when the annual verification is not requested, §13.9 for withdrawal of the SMC when the intermediate one is not. Both omissions are detainable deficiencies (A.1206(34), App. 2, §5 “Areas under the ISM Code”): item .8 “Evidence of the DOC annual verification is not available on board” and item .4 “The SMC intermediate verification is overdue”See the topic sheet
HSSCIntermediate Survey planned as if it had the same window as the Annual Survey, i.e. ±3 months around every anniversary dateSurvey placed outside its window: the Intermediate window is ±3 months around the second or the third anniversary date (SOLAS I/10(a)(iii))See the topic sheet
Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)Intermediate Survey window not tracked with the same priority as RenewalThe certificate shall cease to be valid by force of SOLAS regulation I/14(i)(i), and it does so also where the survey was carried out but not endorsed on the certificate (subparagraph (ii))See the topic sheet
ISPS CertificationISSC intermediate audit scheduled right up against the deadline of the window between the 2nd and 3rd anniversaryRisk of missing the required windowSee the topic sheet
International Load Line CertificateOperating draft exceeding the assigned freeboard for the zone/seasonDirect violation of the Convention, reduction of the real safety marginSee the topic sheet

Related PSC deficiencies

From the PSC Knowledge Base of SuperbaKnowledge. This view selects and organises content published in SuperbaKnowledge; it does not modify or replace it. The linked Knowledge page remains the reference version, while official texts remain authoritative.

Related PSC deficiencies published in SuperbaKnowledge
DeficiencyRegulationIndicative frequencyPossible consequenceTopic sheet
Certificate extended beyond the 3 months permitted from the original expiryHSSC — Res. A.1207(34)Low-MediumCertificate considered invalid, possible detentionSee the topic sheet
Internal audit not conducted on one or more ships within 12 monthsISM Code, para. 12Medium-HighNC at external DOC/SMC renewal auditSee the topic sheet

Glossary of acronyms

Table 17 — Glossary of acronyms
AcronymDefinition
AFSAnti-Fouling Systems Convention (2001)
ASRState-Regions Agreement (training)
BWMBallast Water Management Convention
BWMCBallast Water Management Certificate
CAPACorrective and Preventive Action
CBMCondition-Based Maintenance
CDIChemical Distribution Institute (chemical tanker vetting)
CIICarbon Intensity Indicator
CMSContinuous Machinery Survey
CoCCondition of Class
CSOCompany Security Officer
CVIQCompiled Vessel Inspection Questionnaire (SIRE 2.0)
DCSIMO Data Collection System (fuel oil consumption)
DOCDocument of Compliance (ISM)
DPADesignated Person Ashore
ECAEmission Control Area
EEXIEnergy Efficiency Existing Ship Index
EPLEngine Power Limitation
ESPEnhanced Survey Programme
ETSEmissions Trading System (EU)
GFIGHG Fuel Intensity
GTGross Tonnage
H&MHull & Machinery insurance
HSSCHarmonized System of Survey and Certification
IACSInternational Association of Classification Societies
IAPPInternational Air Pollution Prevention Certificate
IHMInventory of Hazardous Materials
ILLCInternational Load Line Certificate
IOPPInternational Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
ISMInternational Safety Management Code
ISPSInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISSCInternational Ship Security Certificate
LTIFLost Time Injury Frequency (lost-time injuries per 106 hours worked)
MEPCMarine Environment Protection Committee (IMO)
MLCMaritime Labour Convention 2006
MoCManagement of Change
MoUMemorandum of Understanding (PSC)
MRVMonitoring, Reporting and Verification (EU emissions regime)
MTBFMean Time Between Failures
OCIMFOil Companies International Marine Forum
OPEXOperating Expenditure
P&IProtection & Indemnity (liability insurance)
PMSPlanned Maintenance System
PSCPort State Control
RORecognized Organization
SEEMPShip Energy Efficiency Management Plan
SIREShip Inspection Report Programme
SMCSafety Management Certificate
SMSSafety Management System
SOLASSafety of Life at Sea
SSOShip Security Officer
SSPShip Security Plan
STCWStandards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
TMSATanker Management and Self Assessment
VIQVessel Inspection Questionnaire (SIRE, until 2024)
ZNZZero or Near-Zero GHG emission fuels

Regulatory references and sources

Consolidated list of the sources cited in the course, grouped by nature. The references carry a reference date of August 2026: always consult the latest official version in force before any operational application.

Primary regulatory sources

Regulatory references and sources — Primary regulatory sources
SourceOrganisationReference and dateModules
SOLAS 1974, as amendedIMOCh. IX (ISM), Ch. XI-2 (ISPS)2, 3, 5
MARPOL 73/78, Annexes I–VIIMOAnnex VI for efficiency and emissions2, 10
ISM Code — International Safety Management CodeIMOSOLAS Ch. IX2, 3, 4, 12
ISPS Code — International Ship and Port Facility Security CodeIMOSOLAS Ch. XI-22
MLC 2006 — Maritime Labour ConventionILOin force since 20132
STCW 1978IMOManila amendments 20102
Resolution MEPC.328(76)IMOrevised MARPOL Annex VI: EEXI and CII10
Resolutions MEPC.352(78) (as amended by MEPC.412(84)), MEPC.353(78), MEPC.338(76) (as amended by MEPC.400(83)), MEPC.354(78), MEPC.355(78)IMOCII Guidelines G1–G5, respectively: indicators and calculation methods, reference lines, reduction factors, rating, correction factors and voyage adjustments10
Resolution MEPC.395(82), as amended by MEPC.401(83) and MEPC.413(84)IMO2024 Guidelines for the development of the SEEMP, including Part III; revokes MEPC.346(78) (2022), previously amended by MEPC.388(81)10
Resolution MSC.428(98)IMOcyber risk management within the SMS12
ESP Code — Resolution A.1049(27) and subsequent amendmentsIMOEnhanced Survey Programme, bulk carriers and tankers5
Hong Kong Convention 2009IMOin force since 26 June 2025; IHM10
Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 — FuelEU MaritimeEuropean UnionGHG intensity of energy used on board10
Directive (EU) 2023/959 — EU ETSEuropean Unionextension to maritime transport10
Regulation (EU) 2015/757, amended by Reg. (EU) 2023/957European UnionMRV: monitoring, reporting and verification10

Industry guidance

Regulatory references and sources — Industry guidance
SourceOrganisationReference and dateModules
SIRE 2.0 — Ship Inspection Report ProgrammeOCIMFreplaced VIQ7 on 2 September 20248
TMSA — Tanker Management and Self AssessmentOCIMFcompany self-assessment8

Inspection and classification references

Regulatory references and sources — Inspection and classification references
SourceOrganisationReference and dateModules
Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and the USCG regimeRegional MoUs and US Coast GuardPort State Control regimes7
Paris MoU — 46th amendmentParis MoU2025; inspection regime, risk profile, action codes7
Class rulesIACS and classification societiesconstruction, maintenance and survey cycle2, 5, 6
IACS UR E26 and E27IACSships contracted from 1 July 2024; cyber resilience12

Sources to monitor for updates

Regulatory references and sources — Sources to monitor for updates
SourceOrganisationReference and dateModules
IMO Net-Zero FrameworkIMOapproved at MEPC 83 (2025), not yet adopted10
Outcome of MEPC 84IMO27 April – 1 May 2026; Net-Zero Framework, North-East Atlantic ECA, CII review10
Sources to consult for updates

IMO — imo.org (conventions, MEPC/MSC resolutions, Net-Zero Framework status).

OCIMF — ocimf.org (SIRE 2.0 and TMSA documentation).

Paris MoU / Tokyo MoU (inspection regimes, performance lists).

Flag Administration and classification society (RINA/IACS) for applicable requirements.

Educational material

This course is educational material for training purposes and does not constitute a professional certification or qualifying credential. Read the full disclaimer.